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Abstract 
Despite intense academic debates, empirical evidences on the interplay between secularization 
and development in the case of Africa are too scant. In this paper, using individual level data 
from Afrobarometer survey of 2016, cross-section estimations integrated with secularization 
hypotheses are presented to extend the inquiry. Country fixed-effect logistic regressions estimate 
the effects of fundamentals of development on secularization (that is measured by rare-
attendance and non-membership). The cross-section analysis reveals a negative association 
between education and secularization. This result contradicts the conventional view that 
education is a leading source of the seismic social phenomenon of secularization. Estimation 
outcomes due to urbanization are different between rare-attendance and non-membership 
measures of secularization. Whereas urbanization is found to have a positive effect on non-
membership type of secularization, this effect is negative for rare-attendance form of 
secularization. In contrast to education and urbanization, change in measures of income (the 
level of economic condition) is not significantly associated to changes in attendance of religious 
institutions. However, association between secularization and income appears when 
secularization is measured in terms of non-membership that tends to decrease with higher 
income. Generally, the findings cast doubt on traditional conception of secularization hypothesis. 
 
Keywords: Secularization, Education, Income, Urbanization, Africa 
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1 Introduction  
The expression secularization is derived from the Latin root seaculum, which was used by 
Augustine and the early religious leaders as a reflection for the temporal world. 1 
Secularization defines the transformation of a society from close credentials with religious values 
and institutions on the way to non religious values and secular institutions. The term 
secularization is also used as reference to the historical process in which religion loses social and 
cultural importance. In general, secularization has multi-faceted natures that denote quite diverse 
stuffs among other aspects diminishing religious attendance, growing unbelief, weakening 
denominational distinctiveness, loss of trust in religious leaders, and the development of a 
religiously neutral state. As implied by Bailey (2012), a recognizable explanation from all of 
these seemingly different descriptions is that secularization in essence means decline of religion.  
Western Europe is the classic illustration of the secularization of society, underwent an intense 
process of secularization particularly in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (McLeod 
2000). Church and school, besides church and state, were separated; hence church lost its 
importance in the society. The main indicators of secularization, in particular reduced church 
attendance, have been noticeably increasing in Western Europe (Berger 1996). For instance, 
Becker and Woessmann (2013) found out that church attendance fell by 3.6 % per decade, on 
average, among Prussian counties between 1850 and 1931. Western Europe's secularization has 
been regarded as the reflection of the future of all societies - that the boost of modernity dooms 
religion. As Anthony F. C. Wallace (1966:265) described: 
 “The evolutionary future of religion is extinction. Belief in supernatural beings and 
supernatural forces that affect nature without obeying nature's laws will erode and become only 
an interesting historical memory.... Belief in supernatural powers is doomed to die out, all over 
the world, as the result of the increasing adequacy and diffusion of scientific knowledge” 
Declined level of church attendance in many Western European nations is direct consequence of 
this link between modernity and religion.  
                                                          
1 Pérez-Agote, A. (2010). Drawing the boundaries of its validity. 
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However, the very conception of secularization has been in question for the United States of 
America. Even though there is enormous popularity of science and the prevalence of higher 
education in the United States, religion shows no signs of turn down (Greeley 1989). Indeed, 
church membership rates are at an all-time high in the United States (Finke and Stark 1992). 
David Martin (1969:10) tried to explain the case of United States of America as “arrested 
development, whose evolution has been delayed.” Additionally, Wallis (1986) attributed the high 
levels of North American religiousness to ethnic and racial diversity. Despite heated academic 
debates, empirical evidence on the very concept of secularization in the case of Africa is too rare. 
In this paper, the researcher employed country-level cross-sectional data to estimate how relative 
economic development aspects such as education, urbanization and income affect religious 
participation and membership in Africa. Understanding the nature of religious features and 
changes is important for scheming long-run development endeavor of any society. For example, 
Galor (2011) pointed out that via shaping attitudes toward factors such as education, and 
religious orientation of the society can have vital effects for long run development. 
Secularization hypotheses suggest economic development causes individuals to become less 
religious, as it can be manifested by reduced religious beliefs or attendance, and loss of 
conviction on religious membership. Economic development does not comprise a sole dimension 
for determining the wellbeing of creatures. It rather involves usual patterns of change in a 
number of socio-economic and political fundamentals. Amongst others high level of per capita 
income and education, urbanization, improved life expectancy, and lower levels of fertility are 
the key demonstrations of economic development. The center of this study is on the theme of the 
influence of better education, high income and urbanization toward religious attachment of 
individuals. Prominent scholars such as Hume (1757 [1993]) and Freud (1927 [1961]) pointed 
out that increased education might have been a most important source of secularization due to 
the fact that increased critical thinking may have reduced belief in supernatural forces or spirit 
world. Marx (1844) provided a tip about religion as “opium of the people” that is mandatory 
only to lighten the complaint of poor economic conditions. Furthermore, urbanization can make 
religious participation to have higher opportunity cost due to alternative time uses such as 
museums and theaters (McCleary and Barro 2006). However, it is unclear how these 
secularization hypotheses fit to the context of African countries. 
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To present empirical evidence from African countries setting of secularization makeup, this 
study arranged a cross-sectional dataset on education, income, urbanization, and religious 
participation and membership from Afrobarometer research network for the year 2016. This 
cross-sectional dataset assents the researcher to estimate country fixed-effect logistic regressions.  
In the cross-sectional fixed effects models, the result showed that higher education level is 
significantly related to an increase in religious attendance and membership. The significant 
negative effect of urbanization on rare attendance form of secularization is also confirmed in the 
country fixed effect logistic regression model. This estimate is in strong contrast to the 
alternative measure of secularization, which indicates a positive association between 
urbanization and non- membership. As compared to education and urbanization, a change in 
measures of income (economic condition) as another facet of development is not significantly 
related to changes in attendance or participation in religious institutions. 
Succeeding, in section 2 we offer a theoretical structure of secularization and development (the 
role of development in secularization), and empirical reviews. Sections 3 and 4 provide data and 
empirical model. Section 5 describes basic results and robustness check. Section 6 concludes. 
Lastly, section 7 presents limitations and future work. 
2 The Role of Development in Secularization  
The discussion about the theoretical structure of secularization and its relationship with 
education, urbanization and income is to frame the empirical analysis of this study. Then it is 
followed by a summary of the available empirical evidences on the relationship between 
constituents of development and secularization. 
2.1 Theoretical Structure of Secularization and Development 
The religion‐market model and secularization hypothesis of religiosity theories are important 
thesis bring to light the fact that diverse dimensions of modernization may have differing weight 
or relevance for religious participation and affiliation.  
According to the religion‐market model of religiosity or a supply‐side theory, religiosity is 
determined by the existence of a state religion, regulation of the religion market, and the extent 
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of religious diversity2. This approach focuses on supply part effects such as competition among 
religion providers for determining religiosity of the given society rather than the role of demand 
factors like economic development for dealing with secularization. A greater variety of religions 
existing in a given region is considered to encourage greater competition, therefore, a better 
quality religion product and service, consequently lessen levels of secularization. Moreover, the 
degree of religious mixture and competition can be affected by government regulation of 
religious market. For instance, the existence of an established state church is presumed as one 
source of a low degree of religious diversity and, as a result, low participation in religious 
institutions. 
 
Pertaining to secularization hypothesis or a demand‐side theory which is the focus of this study, 
various aspect of development or modernization can cause individuals to become less religious 
or secular that can be measured by religious participation and belongingness. A demand-side 
theory (notice McCleary and Barro 2006) underline the fact that different dimensions of 
                                                          
2  Despite the fact that hub of this study’s analysis toward testing of “demand-side” secularization 
hypotheses, there are crucial evidences that elements of “religion‐market” or “supply-side” model of 
religiosity provide for understanding secularization. Important contributions include McCleary and Barro 
(2006), and Stark and Iannaccone (1994). 
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modernization or development may have differing relevance for religious participation and 
belongingness. 
According to Sen (1999) among many other prominent scholars, development can be seen as a 
course of expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy. Rise in personal incomes, 
industrialization or technological advancement, social modernization, better education and 
health, urbanization, liberty to participate in public discussion and inquiry can considerably 
contribute to enhance human freedom. Therefore, development is a multi-dimensional and 
process in which a society is being improved in the sector of social, political, and economic 
welfare. Moreover, for comprehensive investigation of the source of secularization, the effect of 
development on religiosity depends on the specific facet of modernity. Income, education and 
urbanization are key aspects of development that have been drawn as a momentous features 
affecting secularization and even freedom that people benefit from ( figure 1). 
Regarding income aspect of development, improved income or material conditions may 
condenses demand for religious relief and hence reduce attendance of religious clubs. This 
argument is supported by the statement of Marx (1844) with reference to religion as “opium of 
the people” that is necessary to alleviate the complaint of poor economic status.3  
On the subject of urbanization, it can lead to a reduced interest in attending religious 
organizations as urban areas come with higher opportunity cost of religious participation or 
partaking. Cities proffer numerous alternative time uses such as theaters and museums 
(McCleary and Barro 2006).  
In addition to income and urbanization, education has been articulated as a separate dimension of 
development determining secularization. Increased education may have been a principal source 
of demand-induced secularization by fostering critical thinking that can oppose the established 
religious institutions and beliefs. Even psychological literatures conclude that, though religiosity 
comes natural at early age, rational or cogent reflection can lessen religiosity (Kapogiannis et al. 
2009; Shenhav et al. 2012). 
                                                          
3 Marx, K. (1844). Zur Kritik der Hegel’schen Rechtsphilosophie: Einleitung. In R. Arnold & M. Karl 
(Eds.), Deutsch-Französische Jahrbücher (pp. 71–85). Paris: Bureau der Jahrbücher. 
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Alternatively, secularization can be a cause of development which is represented in terms of 
higher income, better education and urbanization (Fig 1). Based on the work of Strulik (2016), a 
secular personality lets a person to derive more satisfaction or gratification from material 
possessions and consumption than religious persons, dictating secular individuals to study and 
work harder and to save more so as to experience this satisfaction from consumption and 
material possession. As a result of education and hard work, increasing labor supply and capital 
accumulation induces technological progress, income growth and urbanization, which attracts 
further individuals to dump religion in order to derive more gratification from material 
possessions  and consumption. Moreover, higher income, advanced education and urbanization 
make consumption more affordable and increase the demand of a secular trait for the 
subsequently generations. Consumption-induced increase of education, labor supply and savings 
can make secularization a cause of development. 
2.2 Empirical Evidences on Development and Secularization 
Verification for secularization comes predominantly from advanced societies such as West 
European countries. According to the European Values Survey, West-European churches lure 
fewer attendants every year. In the UK, for example, it has been predicted that church presence 
would shrink by 55% from 1980 to 2020 (Brierley 1998). In Finland, the proportion of people 
who in no way attended church enlarged from 15% in 1981 to 28% in 2000 (World Values 
Survey 2006).  Nearly all clued-up investigators such as Barro and McCleary (2002) and Bruce 
(2002), would concur that these transformations happened fundamentally due to elements of 
development such as industrialization and urbanization. In spite of severe academic reflections 
about secularization, empirical confirmation on the sources of secularization is scant. The 
existing evidences, which are by and large cross-sectional, have been mixed and far from 
conclusive.  
In cross-country analyses, McCleary and Barro (2006) disclose that per-capita GDP adversely 
estimates religious participation and that economic growth associates negatively to church 
attendance or presence. Additionally, in cross-country analyses, Paldam and Gundlach (2013) 
and Herzer and Strulik (2016) corroborate a negative effect of income on religiosity. Similarly, 
using U.S. state-level data, Lipford and Tollison (2003) found out an adverse effect of income on 
church membership. Whereas, at the micro-level data, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) 
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reveal that religious beliefs are positively allied with economic attitudes. On the other hand, 
unlike McCleary and Barro (2006), Bettendorf and Dijkgraaf (2010), and Deaton (2011) found 
adverse associations of education with pointers of religiosity in cross-country analyses. 
According to Becker, Naglers and Woessmann (2017), using city- level data from Germany’s 
secularization period (1890–1930), the cross-section result shows insignificant association 
between urbanization and church attendance, but entails positive and significant connection 
between education and church attendance. Generally, Iannaccone (1998) recapitulates the 
literature as follows: “In several analyses of cross-sectional survey data, rates of religious 
activity lean not to decline with income, and most rates amplify with education.” 
However, it is ambiguous to what degree the existing cross-sectional detections suffer from 
omitted-variable bias that related to development entities and secularization. Brown and Taylor 
(2007) found a direct or positive association among education and church attendance in fixed 
effect panel regressions taking into account individual-level data from the British National Child 
Development Study. Becker and Woessmann (2013) studied the interaction between church 
attendance and income in a panel of Prussian counties between 1886 and 1911. And the 
researchers found that the association disappears in panel analyses once; county fixed effects are 
controlled, first-differenced models are counted, panel models with time and county fixed effects 
considered, and panel Granger-causality tests applied. Similarly, in contrast to education which 
is negatively related to church attendance, changes in measures of income (income tax, 
municipal tax) and urbanization (city population) as another dimensions of development are not 
significantly associated to changes in church attendance in panel models where fixed effects 
portrayed for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (Becker, Naglers and Woessmann 2017). 
3   Data 
The data used for the empirical analysis were drawn from a survey of Afrobarometer which is an 
ongoing endeavor committed to cross-country research on national attitude in African countries 
and is Africa’s premier public opinion assessment organization.4 The survey is held in a large 
                                                          
4 Afrobarometer, as the name implies, is non-partisan, a pan-African research network that conducts 
public attitude surveys on economic condition, governance, democracy, and associated concerns in more 
than 35 African countries. Data are downloadable from http://www.afrobarometer.org/data 
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number of African countries in six rounds. This study used the round 6 data (2016) which is the 
latest one among the accessible data for use. 5 The survey provides information on individual 
socio-economic characteristics such as the age, gender, place of resident, education level and 
economic conditions. 6  Also data are available for a wide variety of religious measures and 
respondent characteristics.  
4   Empirical Model 
Religion in Africa is multifaceted and has been a foremost influence on the issue of art, culture 
and philosophy.  The continent's vast majority of people are adherents of the world’s two largest 
religions, Christianity and Islam. In spite of the domination of Christianity and Islam, traditional 
African religious practices and faith in sacrifices to ancestors, witchcraft, traditional religious 
healers and re-embodiment have not vanished. Rather, traditional religious exercises coexist with 
Islam and Christianity (Lugo and Cooperman 2010). While it is hard to observe alterations in 
religious beliefs in the African context, variation in religious participation and membership itself 
has important societal connotations.  
Following the literature review discussed this research paper center on the effect of development 
on secularization. The study primarily analyses of the effect of income, urbanization and 
education on secularization. Unlike the majority of studies on the topic of secularization, this 
research paper provides alternative descriptions of secularization for African countries using 
frequency of attendance of religious service and religious institutions membership status as 
                                                          
5 Round 6 data are from the following countries: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Gabon, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
6 Afrobarometer doesn’t have any information about the amount of revenue or expenditure of the 
respondents. 
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proxy for religiousness and/or being secular. 7  The study considered minimum frequency of 
religious practice and membership status as objective measures of secularization. To do so, 
secularization is measured using two indicators;  
 
And 
 
Where, SS1 and SS2 denote Secular Status.   
The dependent variable, that reflects the topic of this study which is secularization, is a 
dichotomous variable that received the value of 1 for a ‘secular’ respondent (defined above) and 
0 otherwise.  
To analyze whether the result of the study depends on the choice of the religious variable and to 
assess religiosity or secularization suitably in an inclusive approach, the researcher employed 
both membership and practice measures of secularization. The advantage of attendance and 
membership measure is that it is quantifiable and objective. Obviously, reduced attendance or being 
non-member of any religious institutions does not necessarily reflect a reduction in “religiosity” in the 
common sense of inner stance towards belief in God. It is in this manner that this paper uses the word 
“secularization”. 
A logistic regression model is applied to estimate how relative economic development aspects 
such as education, urbanization and income affect secularization or religiosity in terms of 
participation and membership. In the logit model, we estimate the probability to be secular 
thanks to different independent variables like age, gender, economic condition, place of 
residence, level of education, support for democracy and religion denominations. Regression 
                                                          
7 The religious rules of worshippers rarely vary between religions (e.g., many conventional Jews can 
congregate once a day, while Christians and Muslim expected to attend religious service at least once a 
week).  
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analysis is used for the inference of the probability to be secular, or it is to estimate the effects of 
the various explanatory variables on secularization (that is measured by rare-attendance and non-
membership of religious organizations), provides support to corollaries derived from the 
theoretical framework. 
5   Results 
In section 5.1 and 5.2, the research paper discuses socio-economic attributes with respect to 
secularization and country-fixed effect regressions findings, correspondingly. 
5.1 Socio-economic Characteristics and Secularization  
Pooling the data for the 36 countries, table 1 provides the characteristics of individuals applied 
for the estimation of factor affecting secularization in the context of Africa.  
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Table 1 Individual Characteristic, Afrobarometer (2016) 
 
 
  Measures of Secularization 
  Secular (rare 
practice) (%) 
Secular (not a member) (%) 
Gender Female                         23 51.2 
Male 29.3 53.2 
Age 
 
 
18-25 27.2 54.6 
26-45 25.8 51.9 
46-65 24.6 50.5 
Over 65 29.8 49.7 
Education No Formal 
Education 
24.5 56.8 
Primary Education 28.2 50.4 
Secondary 
Education 
25.4 50.2 
Post Secondary 
Education 
25.7 54.4 
Place of 
Residence 
Urban  26 56.1 
Rural 26.3 49.4 
Economic 
Condition 
Bad 25.7 50.7 
 Intermediate 29.2 53.6 
Good 24.8 53.3 
Support for 
Democracy 
No  31.7 56.9 
Neutral 29.2 51.3 
Yes 24.1 51.6 
Religion Christian 24.7 42.7 
Muslim 18.5 64.3 
Others 58.1 64.8 
Total Secular (%)  26.1 52.2 
Source:  Own Computation, Afrobarometer Dataset. 2019 
 
The characteristics of the rare-attendance type of secularization are comparable to that of non-
member structure of secularization in many ways. At the time of the survey, as it can be seen 
from the above table, 23% of female and 29.3% of male, as well as 51.2% of female and 53.2% 
of male were ‘secular’ in view of rare-practice (attendance) and non-member aspects of 
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secularization, respectively. Evaluating the distribution of secularization figures in the age 
categories, over group, changes were almost similar for both dimensions of secularization, 
decreasing from the age group of 18-25 through 46-65. Relatively, over 65 age or retired are 
more secular in the form of rare attendance than others.  
For the case of education, defining secular trait as rare-attendance, the proportion of secular 
individuals stood at 24.5% for those with no formal education, 28.2% for primary education 
completed, 25.4% for high school graduated and 25.7% for post high school group. Whereas, 
taking into account non-membership makeup of secular attribute, the figures were 56.8%, 50.4%, 
50.2% and 54.4% for the aforementioned matching educational categories, implying there is 
irregular trend of secularization among the given categories of education. The fraction of rare 
attendant (secular) among rural and urban dwellers is hardly differ, 26% and 26.3% for urban 
and rural residents, respectively. This figure is fairly unusual given that substitute measure of 
secularization found out that 56.1% of urban and 49.4% of rural residents are non-members of 
any religious institutions (table 1). Although there is no direct income information from 
Afrobarometer dataset, information about the economic situation of the given individuals is 
available. The distributions of share changes of secular entity over the non-member and rare-
attendant measures of secularization are quite corresponding. 
The classical theory of secularization posits that since democracy is one of the most fundamental 
components of a modern society, democracy directs to secularization. However, table 1 showed 
the existence of higher tendency in opposition to democracy among either secular group. 
Comparing the percentage of self claim religious individuals who do seldom or never attend 
services, Muslims have a highest participation rate or lower secular characteristic compared to 
Christian and Others. However, the level being a member of religious institutions amongst 
Muslims is lower than that of Christians. In general, even if attendance and membership are the 
key ingredients to measure secularization or religiosity, the proportion of secular group in the 
form of rare attendant is exactly half of the prearranged substitute measure of secularization 
(Table 1). 
14 
 
5.2 Estimation Results 
Table 2 presents country fixed-effects logistic regressions for two alternative dependent variables 
of secularization: (i) low frequency of attendance; and (ii) being non-member of any religious 
denominations. The fixed-effects regression, that includes country effects, is applied to correct 
for country specific features. 
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Table 2 Country Fixed-Effects Logistic Secularization Regressions (Reporting Coefficients) 
 
Explanatory Variables Dependent Variables 
Rare- Attendance Being Non-Member 
Gender   
Male .409246  
(0.000) 
.0948543  
(0.000) 
Age   
18-25 Reference Reference 
26-65 -.1239531  
(0.000) 
-.2560897  
(0.000) 
over 65 -.1483586  
(0.006) 
-.4431767  
(0.000) 
Education   
No Formal Education Reference Reference 
Primary Education -.1884976  
(0.000) 
-.0363577  
(0.246) 
Secondary Education -.3420188  
(0.000) 
-.1048149  
(0.001) 
Post Secondary Education -.289192  
(0.000) 
-.1745019  
(0.000) 
Urbanization   
Urban -.128395  
(0.000) 
.2553317  
(0.000) 
Economic Condition   
Bad Reference Reference 
Intermediate .0197625   
(0.497) 
-.0374919  
(0.151) 
Good .0132876  
(0.611) 
-.129934  
(0.000) 
Support for Democracy   
No Reference Reference 
Neutral -.0638169  
(0.089) 
-.058949  
(0.092) 
Yes -.2318551  
(0.000) 
-.0962003  
(0.002) 
Religion   
Christian Reference Reference 
Muslims -.3126087  
(0.000) 
.4308255 
(0.000) 
Others 1.663047  
(0.000) 
.84358 
(0.000) 
_cons -.4448744   
(0.000) 
1.459757  
(0.000) 
Number of Observation 52596 53798 
Prob > chi2      0.0000 0.0000 
1. p-values (significance levels) in parentheses. 
2. Stata 13 was used for estimation of country Fixed-Effects Logistic regressions. 
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For this study purpose, attendance and membership are two dimensions of religiosity considered 
for the analysis of secularization. The figures that are associated to the explanatory variables are 
the raw coefficients of the Logit regression that maximizes the logarithm of the likelihood 
function. The coefficient of the Logit regression illustrates the effect of the explanatory variable 
on the logit (or log-odds) of the dependent variable. A negative raw coefficient of the Logit 
regression implies adverse relationship between the explanatory variable under discussion and 
the likelihood or odds of secularization. On the contrary, a positive coefficient of the Logit 
regression means that the prospect of secularization is positively related to the significant 
explanatory variables. 
As it is evident from Table 2, the effects of socio-economic characteristics on secularization 
differ between the specified approaches of secularization. The regression results show that: In 
both measures of secularization, the probability of being a secular person is more frequent for 
male than female complement. The figure is in line as one could expect, male are more secular 
than female counterpart. Findings of ample studies, for example, Loveland (2003) and Brañas-
Garza and Neuman (2004) confirm that women are usually more religious compared to men 
complement. The effect of age is almost similar between the available approaches of 
secularization. Age has a negative effect on being a ‘non-member’; the probability of having a 
non-member form of secular trait decreases continuously with increasing age compared to the 
reference age category of 18-25. Also regarding ‘rare practice’ there is diminishing likelihood to 
be secular as age raises taking into account aforementioned reference age cluster.  
Education seems to affect the tendency to become secular. The effect of education is also more 
pronounced: formal education (above and including elementary school) weighted against 
informal education decreases the probability being secular in terms of attendance and 
membership as well (Table 2). It is, most probably, because religious institution attendance has a 
social networking positive effect for educated individuals who use religion as a form of shared 
interaction (Glaeser and Sacerdote 2008). Usually, the ideal purpose for attendance is salvation. 
Conversely, there are loads of non-salvation causes for religious service attendance such as 
social drive to exchange various thoughts with fellow congregants (Monaghan 1967). The same 
can be relevant for religious institutions membership; there is probability of non-salvation 
intentions such as social belongingness and status.  Additionally, formal education can increase 
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the level of diversity and number of religious denominations through promoting people to 
express their ideas and feelings. Since more people are able to get access to the religion and 
denomination of their preference or choice, certain indicators of religiosity, principally 
attendance and denomination can get augmented (Bruce 2006). Furthermore, the results of this 
study support hypothesis found on advantages of educated people in the kind of abstract thinking 
required for religion or faith (McCleary and Barro 2006). Generally, the result is not in line with 
the traditional view that higher education reduces religious attendance or membership.  
As it is perceptible from Table 2, the effects of urbanization on the various aspects of 
secularization (rare-attendance and being non-member) are noticeably different. The bond 
between urbanization and secularization suggests different results when secularization is 
measured as participation compared to when it is measured as membership. Urbanization goes 
hand-in-hand with life advancement and/or a closely related aspect of economic development 
(McBride 2005). Urbanization is a physical growth in the urban areas because of, amongst other 
things, rural to urban migration and international immigration as well. Difference in life 
traditions between rural and urban areas confirms urbanization as a one potential determinant for 
secularization. The finding of this study proved that the probability of being a member of 
religious institutions reduces among urban residents compared to rural dwellers. This is 
associated to the usual presumption that people living in the rural areas have high levels of social 
ties that can avail membership experiences. On account of this attribute, people in rural areas are 
enforced to conform to their collective customs or standards which are replicated in terms of 
religiosity (Siegman, 1962).  Additionally, the result of this study revealed that the likelihood of 
attending religious institutions is higher in urban areas than that of rural province. Urbanization 
went along with rural-urban migration and relevant in the argument of urbanization because it is 
one of the most important building blocks of urbanization processes. And adjustment to a new 
environment due to migration can bring challenges of its own. Therefore, in pursuit of better 
economic gain, a new life in a city environment can increase interest in attending religious 
institutions so as to encounter new interactions and opportunities. 
Economic development or economic condition can be an important determinant of 
secularization, based on Marx’s (1844) thesis “religion is opium of the people”, the enhancement 
of material conditions possibly will trim down the need for religious support.  Alongside of Marx 
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(1844), humans are essentially wary of insecurities. These insecurities such as poverty are argued 
to be the main driving forces for human beings to seek supernatural help (Norris and Inglehart, 
2004). However, the existing and this study’s empirical evidences are far from conclusive. As it 
can be seen from table 2 above , in contrast to education and urbanization, change in measures of 
income (the level of economic condition) is not significantly related to changes in attendance, 
confirming contemporary research studies at the county-level (Becker and Woessmann 2013) 
and at the city-level (Becker, Nagler and Woessmann 2017). The insignificant and positive point 
estimated for its coefficient casts doubt on the causal hypothesis that income adversely affected 
religiosity. On the contrary, this research work provided that the probability of having 
membership in religious institutions increases with better income or economic condition, 
sustaining the work of Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) who found out that religious 
attachment are positively linked with economic attitudes.  
Democracy is an important determinant of secularization for the reason that democracy can free 
people from the constraints of any form of religion as a whole. Alternatively, democracy can 
open doors or provide opportunities for non-traditional as well as traditional religions to develop 
and exercise freely. This cross-country data research suggested that those who are supporting 
democracy are less secular, implying democracy has made it possible for people to choose their 
beliefs. Democracy avails fertile ground for systems of belief to participate in the religious 
market and people are able to choose and have more choices over a range of beliefs, the 
probability that the population is getting more religious service increases. Supporting this 
argument, Opfinger (2011) has suggested that the increase of religious pluralism seem to 
increase the overall level of religiosity. To analyze whether religious denomination affect 
secularization, religion dummies applied. Allowing for Christian religion faction as a reference, 
the probability of attending religious institutions is higher for Muslims, and less likely for the 
‘Others (like Jews, Hindu, Buddhist, etc)’ religion group. Additionally, as compared to 
Christians, Muslims and Others have lower probability to have membership in religious 
institutions (Table 2).  
5.3 Robustness in Estimation Technique 
In this section the robustness checks that the paper employed is to compare the logit-based 
coefficient estimates with coefficient estimates using probit approach, addressing concerns about 
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methods of estimation technique bias. Recall that the study used two alternatives of 
secularization reflections: rare practice and non-membership of religious institutions, the 
estimation results using probit are reported in Table 3 and 4 under the appendix part. The results 
are reasonably consistent across the two estimation techniques.  
6 Conclusions 
In spite of widespread academic arguments on the source of secularization, practical evidences 
from economics perspective have not been analyzed in the case of Africa so far. And so, the 
purpose of this paper has been to investigate the effect of development fundamentals on 
secularization in African context. Secularization is captured by two measures: rare-attendance 
and non- membership of any religious institutions. The empirical work of this study is based on a 
cross-section analysis derived from individual level data collected in the 6th round of 
Afrobarometer survey.  
Estimation of the effect of education, urbanization and income on secularization, using 
Afrobarometer (2016) data, indicated that higher education, measured by high-school completed 
and post high-school graduated, is negatively associated with rare-attendance and non-
membership. This result doesn’t support the traditional view of secularization hypothesis that 
education furthered secularization. The negative association between education and 
secularization (rare-attendance and non-membership) signifies that education plays a significant 
role in social association or attachment. Such finding can assist policy-makers in determining 
strategies to improve social inclusion ventures. Applying rare-attendance approach of 
secularization, urbanization and secularization are adversely correlated. Due to rural-urban 
migration, which is the foundation of urbanization, interest in attending religious institutions can 
be augmented in order to exploit opportunities and interactions important for common socio-
economic gain. However, the finding turned around when non-member type of secularization 
was employed. It confirms the usual presumption that rural residents compared to urban dwellers 
have high levels of social tie experiences such as membership in religious institutions.  
In contrast to education and urbanization, change in measures of income (the level of economic 
condition) is not significantly associated to changes in religious institution attendance, 
supporting the findings of the topical studies at the county-level (Becker and Woessmann 2013) 
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and at the city-level (Becker, Nagler and Woessmann 2017). Conversely, religiosity measured in 
terms of membership tends to increase with income, suggesting the worth of social responsibility 
and interactions among relatively high income dwellers in Africa.  
7 Limitations and Future Work 
Self-assessed replies on one’s own religious position may comprise heuristic biases that are 
unseen by the researcher. While the cross-sectional analyses this paper employed cast strong 
doubt on a causal interpretation of the simple associations, future researches should at least 
utilize panel data to control omitted (unobserved or miss-measured) variables. Due to the 
presence of unobserved heterogeneity, or omitted variables, and reverse causality emanated from 
the nature of the study and Afrobarometer dataset, there could be an endogeneity problem. And 
this problem prevents us from making causal claims. Modeling directly exogenous variations in 
explanatory variables or applying instrumental variable techniques can address the problem of 
endogeneity, thus we can develop a casual identification among the given variables. Moreover, if 
it is possible, better to investigate ways to conduct counterfactual analysis to boldly declare the 
main sources of secularization.  
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Appendix  
Table 3 Country Fixed-Effects Probit ‘rare-attendance’ Regression (Reporting Coefficients)  
 
                                                                                           
                    _cons    -.3003662   .0539853    -5.56   0.000    -.4061754   -.1945571
                           
                Zimbabwe     -.3068952   .0540724    -5.68   0.000     -.412875   -.2009153
                  Zambia      -.882837   .0661104   -13.35   0.000    -1.012411    -.753263
                  Uganda     -.2890192   .0531955    -5.43   0.000    -.3932805    -.184758
                 Tunisia      .1507755   .0551005     2.74   0.006     .0427805    .2587704
                    Togo     -.4434682   .0611562    -7.25   0.000    -.5633321   -.3236044
                Tanzania     -.2733401   .0518078    -5.28   0.000    -.3748815   -.1717987
               Swaziland     -.3620386    .060979    -5.94   0.000    -.4815552    -.242522
                   Sudan     -.0227789   .0557561    -0.41   0.683    -.1320588     .086501
            South Africa      .0117275   .0524592     0.22   0.823    -.0910906    .1145456
            Sierra Leone     -.4593248    .060029    -7.65   0.000    -.5769796   -.3416701
                 Senegal     -1.064679   .0744495   -14.30   0.000    -1.210597   -.9187607
   São Tomé and Príncipe      .0197724    .059195     0.33   0.738    -.0962477    .1357924
                 Nigeria      -.595667   .0533651   -11.16   0.000    -.7002608   -.4910733
                   Niger     -.3356358   .0593998    -5.65   0.000    -.4520573   -.2192143
                 Namibia       .220245   .0587117     3.75   0.000     .1051721    .3353179
              Mozambique      .2012056   .0510294     3.94   0.000     .1011897    .3012214
                 Morocco      .5853715   .0536083    10.92   0.000     .4803012    .6904418
               Mauritius     -.8041577   .0614639   -13.08   0.000    -.9246248   -.6836906
                    Mali     -1.123669   .0699662   -16.06   0.000    -1.260801   -.9865383
                  Malawi     -.3863612   .0536278    -7.20   0.000    -.4914698   -.2812525
              Madagascar     -.0996665   .0598054    -1.67   0.096    -.2168829    .0175499
                 Liberia     -.0084223   .0590573    -0.14   0.887    -.1241725    .1073278
                 Lesotho      .4238313   .0585556     7.24   0.000     .3090644    .5385981
                   Kenya     -.5573122   .0546047   -10.21   0.000    -.6643353    -.450289
                  Guinea     -1.312078   .0830098   -15.81   0.000    -1.474774   -1.149382
                   Ghana     -.2701162   .0526416    -5.13   0.000    -.3732917   -.1669406
                   Gabon      -.120254   .0601617    -2.00   0.046    -.2381687   -.0023392
           Cote d'Ivoire     -.4935074   .0613382    -8.05   0.000     -.613728   -.3732868
              Cape Verde      .6431575   .0593689    10.83   0.000     .5267967    .7595184
                Cameroon     -.2277454   .0598868    -3.80   0.000    -.3451214   -.1103693
                 Burundi     -.3292403   .0617233    -5.33   0.000    -.4502158   -.2082648
            Burkina Faso     -.7962055   .0654235   -12.17   0.000    -.9244333   -.6679778
                Botswana      .1341543   .0592637     2.26   0.024     .0179996    .2503089
                   Benin      -.506468   .0607985    -8.33   0.000     -.625631   -.3873051
                  Country  
                           
                  Others      .9898795   .0212105    46.67   0.000     .9483078    1.031451
                  Muslim     -.1709912   .0227485    -7.52   0.000    -.2155774    -.126405
                 Religion  
                           
                     yes     -.1381006   .0196214    -7.04   0.000    -.1765578   -.0996434
                 neutral        -.0381   .0221509    -1.72   0.085    -.0815149    .0053149
         DemocracySupport  
                           
                    good      .0059471   .0151496     0.39   0.695    -.0237455    .0356397
            Intermediate      .0127766   .0170054     0.75   0.452    -.0205535    .0461066
        EconomicCondition  
                           
                   urban     -.0716348   .0140766    -5.09   0.000    -.0992245   -.0440451
             Urbanization  
                           
post secondary education     -.1621927   .0253675    -6.39   0.000     -.211912   -.1124734
     secondary education     -.1928457   .0215668    -8.94   0.000    -.2351158   -.1505756
       primary education     -.1031861    .020644    -5.00   0.000    -.1436476   -.0627245
                Education  
                           
                 over 65     -.0855499   .0313991    -2.72   0.006    -.1470909   -.0240088
                   26-65     -.0741111   .0149769    -4.95   0.000    -.1034653    -.044757
                      Age  
                           
                    male      .2360438    .012696    18.59   0.000       .21116    .2609275
                   Gender  
                                                                                           
             RarePractice        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                           
Log likelihood = -26532.475                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1214
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(47)     =    7328.81
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      52596
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Table 4 Country Fixed-Effects Probit ‘non-member’ Regression (Reporting Coefficients) 
 
                                                                                           
                    _cons     .8684684   .0550336    15.78   0.000     .7606045    .9763322
                           
                Zimbabwe     -1.136824   .0547569   -20.76   0.000    -1.244145   -1.029502
                  Zambia     -1.483427   .0622188   -23.84   0.000    -1.605373    -1.36148
                  Uganda     -.7410386   .0538885   -13.75   0.000    -.8466582   -.6354191
                 Tunisia      1.344993   .1168292    11.51   0.000     1.116012    1.573974
                    Togo     -.8409366   .0597744   -14.07   0.000    -.9580922   -.7237809
                Tanzania     -.8107353   .0526336   -15.40   0.000    -.9138952   -.7075754
               Swaziland     -1.021558    .060435   -16.90   0.000    -1.140008   -.9031077
                   Sudan      -.488013   .0577728    -8.45   0.000    -.6012457   -.3747804
            South Africa     -.7026815   .0539882   -13.02   0.000    -.8084965   -.5968665
            Sierra Leone     -1.737399   .0606989   -28.62   0.000    -1.856367   -1.618431
                 Senegal     -1.141699   .0575224   -19.85   0.000    -1.254441   -1.028957
   São Tomé and Príncipe     -1.149733    .060581   -18.98   0.000    -1.268469   -1.030996
                 Nigeria     -1.082601   .0522131   -20.73   0.000    -1.184936   -.9802649
                   Niger     -.1352111   .0612324    -2.21   0.027    -.2552244   -.0151978
                 Namibia     -.5927614   .0601764    -9.85   0.000    -.7107048   -.4748179
              Mozambique      -1.25667   .0536428   -23.43   0.000    -1.361808   -1.151532
                 Morocco      .1906951   .0642289     2.97   0.003     .0648088    .3165815
               Mauritius     -.3005448     .06148    -4.89   0.000    -.4210433   -.1800463
                    Mali     -.2585094   .0605939    -4.27   0.000    -.3772713   -.1397475
                  Malawi     -1.586608   .0556162   -28.53   0.000    -1.695613   -1.477602
              Madagascar     -.2729263   .0613599    -4.45   0.000    -.3931894   -.1526631
                 Liberia     -1.442915   .0618454   -23.33   0.000     -1.56413     -1.3217
                 Lesotho     -.4195272   .0607614    -6.90   0.000    -.5386173    -.300437
                   Kenya      -1.06097   .0538979   -19.68   0.000    -1.166608   -.9553325
                  Guinea     -.6205957   .0582568   -10.65   0.000    -.7347769   -.5064145
                   Ghana     -1.051373   .0536884   -19.58   0.000      -1.1566   -.9461456
                   Gabon     -.4075269    .060789    -6.70   0.000    -.5266711   -.2883827
           Cote d'Ivoire     -.6662524   .0588229   -11.33   0.000    -.7815433   -.5509616
              Cape Verde     -.4889397   .0609988    -8.02   0.000    -.6084951   -.3693842
                Cameroon     -.5526359   .0595675    -9.28   0.000    -.6693862   -.4358857
                 Burundi     -.3009651   .0613827    -4.90   0.000    -.4212731   -.1806572
            Burkina Faso      -.727883   .0586788   -12.40   0.000    -.8428914   -.6128746
                Botswana     -1.087873   .0605508   -17.97   0.000     -1.20655   -.9691957
                   Benin     -.8429419    .059238   -14.23   0.000    -.9590462   -.7268375
                  Country  
                           
                  Others      .5144928   .0207245    24.83   0.000     .4738735    .5551121
                  Muslim      .2660845   .0193514    13.75   0.000     .2281565    .3040125
                 Religion  
                           
                     yes     -.0594928   .0188114    -3.16   0.002    -.0963626   -.0226231
                 neutral     -.0384664   .0213047    -1.81   0.071    -.0802229    .0032902
         DemocracySupport  
                           
                    good     -.0802668   .0138724    -5.79   0.000    -.1074563   -.0530774
            Intermediate     -.0240272   .0158942    -1.51   0.131    -.0551792    .0071248
        EconomicCondition  
                           
                   urban      .1552299    .012975    11.96   0.000     .1297994    .1806604
             Urbanization  
                           
post secondary education     -.1052517   .0235043    -4.48   0.000    -.1513192   -.0591841
     secondary education      -.064104   .0196835    -3.26   0.001    -.1026829   -.0255251
       primary education     -.0215459   .0190432    -1.13   0.258    -.0588698     .015778
                Education  
                           
                 over 65     -.2725099   .0296037    -9.21   0.000    -.3305322   -.2144877
                   26-65     -.1562724   .0138831   -11.26   0.000    -.1834828   -.1290619
                      Age  
                           
                    male      .0558315   .0117364     4.76   0.000     .0328286    .0788343
                   Gender  
                                                                                           
                NonMember        Coef.   Std. Err.      z    P>|z|     [95% Conf. Interval]
                                                                                           
Log likelihood = -32027.717                       Pseudo R2       =     0.1211
                                                  Prob > chi2     =     0.0000
                                                  LR chi2(47)     =    8823.35
Probit regression                                 Number of obs   =      52596
